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This study examined the endorsement of cognitive distortions in child pornography offenders (CPOs), 
using an established assessment tool, the Abel and Becker Cognition Scale. The scale was expanded 
to include cognitions specific to child pornography offending, extracted from Howitt and Sheldon’s 
Children and Sexual Activities Inventory (C&SA). Three samples of CPOs, child sex offenders and 
offenders with both offence types responded to the cognition items. An exploratory Principal 
Component Analysis suggested six main components of the scale. CPOs were significantly less likely 
to endorse these statements in general, and this was more pronounced on items that project blame onto 
the child or other people, describe a need for power and consider children as sexually active. The 
statements extracted from C&SA did not differentiate between the groups. These findings are 
discussed under consideration of the relationship between cognitive distortions and contact sex 
offending, and in reference to the general criticism concerning the definition and appropriate 
measurement of cognitive distortions. 
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The endorsement of cognitive distortions: comparing child pornography offenders and contact 
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The professional literature surrounding sex offending has focused on cognitions as a 
crucial factor in initialising and maintaining the abusive behaviour (e.g., The Integrated 
Theory of Sexual Offending, Ward & Beech, 2006; The Schema-Based Model of Sexual 
Assault, Mann & Beech, 2003). In his cognitive models of therapy, Beck (1963) initially 
introduced the term cognitive distortions as referring to unfounded or dysfunctional thought 
content in his patients. With regard to contact child sex offenders (CSOs), Abel et al. (1989) 
defined cognitive distortions as ‘justifications, perceptions and judgements used by the sex 
offender to rationalize his child molestation behaviour’ (p. 137). Recently, a professional 
debate has emerged surrounding the conceptualisation and terminological specificity of 
cognitive distortions (Friestad, 2011; Ó Ciardha & Gannon, 2011), the value of targeting them 
in sex offender treatment (Marshall, Marshall, & Kingston, 2011), and their appropriate 
measurement (Gannon, 2009; Snowden, Craig, & Gray, 2011). 
There are currently two approaches to assessing for cognitive distortions: (1) explicit 
measures, such as psychometric scales [e.g., the Abel and Becker Cognition Scale (ABCS; 
Abel et al., 1984)], where the presence of offence-supportive beliefs is deducted from 
responses to questionnaire items and (2) implicit measures (e.g., the Implicit Association 
Test; Gray, Brown, MacCulloch, Smith, & Snowden, 2005), where the presence of offence 
supportive beliefs is deducted from differences in one’s response latencies. Both approaches 
hold conceptual challenges in that they can only be considered a proxy to accessing cognitive 
distortions, however, to date define the consensual approach in measuring these underlying 
belief systems.  
With the advent of the Internet, a new category of sex offenders has become 
prevalent, namely those who use the Internet in some manner to sexually offend. 
Subsequently, child pornography offenders (CPOs) have received much research attention in 
recent years, both empirically (see Babchishin, Hanson, & Herrmann, 2010) anv theoretically 
(e.g., Merdian, Curtis, Thakker, Wilson, & Boer, 2011). Some stable differences have been 
established between CPOs and CSOs regarding psychological and offence-related variables 
(Babchishin et al., 2010; Elliott, Beech, & Mandelville- Norden, 2012).  
Exploring the cognitive distortions of CPOs is thus informative for at least two 
reasons. First, an analysis of CPOs’ endorsement of sexual thoughts surrounding children will 
allow further insight into the differences between CPOs and CSOs; for example, regarding 
assessment and treatment needs of this specific offender population. Second, on a conceptual 
level, CPOs can be considered as being located in the centre of a continuum between thinking 
(fantasy-driven) about child sexual abuse and translating their cognitions into actions 
(contact-driven), where the viewing or downloading of images combines both cognitive and 
behavioural elements. For some, child pornography viewing may represent a pre-stage to contact sex 
contact sex offending, moving from the endorsement of child sexual abuse through imagery to direct 
involvement with a child victim. Exploring the question of fantasy-driven versus contact-driven 
cognitive distortions will directly contribute to an understanding of risk for this offender group, of 
both re-offending and cross-over behaviour to contact child sexual abuse. 
Cognitive distortions in CPOs 
Research on cognitive distortions of CPOs is still sparse. Most studies refer to extraction of 
such cognitions from material not originally intended for respective research, such as online chat 
protocols of an adult with a minor (DeLong, Durkin, & Hundersmarck, 2010) or online postings on 
paedophile-supportive websites (D’Ovidio, Mitman, El-Burki, & Shumar, 2009; Durkin & Bryant, 
1999; Holt, Blevins, & Burkert, 2010; O’Halloran & Quayle, 2010). Bates and Metcalf (2007) 
compared 39 CPOs and 39 CSOs on a number of psychological scales, including a scale for cognitive 
distortions and victim empathy (scale titles not specified). CPOs appeared to score considerably lower 
on both scales, however, no information about statistical significance was provided. Elliott, Beech, 
Mandelville-Norden, and Hayes (2009) examined a larger offender sample (505 CPOs, 526 CSOs) on 
the Victim Empathy Distortion Scale (Beckett & Fisher, 1994) and the Children and Sex Cognitions 
Questionnaire (Beckett, 1987); on both scales, CSOs were found to have significantly higher scores 
than CPOs. In a follow-up study, Elliott et al. (2012) compared 526 CSOs, 459 CPOs and 13 mixed 
offenders (MOs; offenders with both offence types) and confirmed the stronger endorsement of 
cognitive distortions and victim empathy distortions in CSOs. Somewhat unexpectedly, the group of 
MOs displayed the highest empathetic concern in comparison to the other two groups. 
Finally, in their meta-analysis, Babchishin et al. (2010) reported that contact offenders were 
found to display significantly stronger emotional identification with children and higher endorsement 
of cognitive distortions than CPOs. However, they did not identify any difference between the 
offender types regarding victim empathy. There are two potential explanations for these findings: (1) 
CPOs endorse fewer cognitive distortions than contact CSOs or (2) CPOs endorse different cognitive 
distortions to those supported by CSOs, which are not included in current standardised measures. 
With regards to the latter, O’Brien and Webster (2007) developed a questionnaire on Internet 
Behaviours and Attitudes (IBAQ), which includes two subscales: (1) Behavioural items: Items 
regarding various online behaviours; for example, which online facilities were visited by the offender 
or which methods were used to obtain child pornography from the Internet; and (2) Attitudinal items: 
Items referring to the offender’s attitudes about the Internet in general and his child pornography 
offending. Amongst the 123 CPOs tested, it was found that the more behaviours a person admitted to, 
the higher the attitudinal score obtained by the individual (indicative of offence-supportive cognitive 
distortions). People with higher attitudinal scores generally showed more online social activities 
relating to child pornography. Furthermore, they appeared more organised and were more engaged in 
their child pornography offending, used the material in a sexual manner, and reported fewer 
regrets about their offensive behaviour. 
However, no follow-up research was identified using the IBAQ for further validation. 
Howitt and Sheldon (2007) developed the Children and Sexual Activities Inventory (C&SA) 
from existing cognitive distortion scales, i.e., the ABCS, the MOLEST (Bumby, 1996) and 
Hanson Sex Attitude Questionnaire (Hanson, Gizzarelli, & Scott, 1994). The 39 items of the 
C&SA allow for classification according to Ward and Keenan’s (1999) five implicit core 
schemas of cognitive distortions: (1) Children as Sexual Objects, (2) Entitlement, (3) 
Dangerous world, (4) Uncontrollability and (5) Nature of Harm, suggesting some similarity to 
conventional distortion scales. Using a sample of 16 CPOs, 25 CSOs and 10 MOs, two 
principal components emerged underlying the C&SA: Children as Sexual Objects and 
Justifications for Offending, with CPOs scoring higher on the first factor. Despite its 
contribution to this novel area, the study by Howitt and Sheldon (2007) had several 
limitations including small sample sizes and the use of the same participants for both factor 
analytic validation and for group comparisons. In addition, the extracted factors accounted for 
only 40.38% of the overall variance. Nevertheless, a developing research area such as online 
sex offending is dependent on exploratory research projects to build a larger-scale, theory-
based empirical foundation. 
Scope of the current study 
The current study is aimed to build on Howitt and Sheldon’s original contribution and 
to further broaden the knowledge base about CPOs’ cognitive distortions in a predominantly 
exploratory manner. While existing assessment and treatment models for CPOs are strongly 
oriented to the ‘what works’ literature based on CSOs (e.g., Hayes & Middleton, 2006), more 
specific knowledge about their content, such as the cognitive distortions endorsed by CPOs, 
will assist in developing assessment and treatment methods responsive to their criminogenic 
needs and provide further insight into the role of cognitive distortions in the contact offence 
process. In short, CPOs should not be treated like CSOs without supportive research 
evidence. Consequently, the predominant research task of comparing CSOs and CPOs should 
initially build upon the recognised research knowledge in the field, for example, by using a 
cognitive distortion scale that has been well-established with CSOs as a starting point. Abel et 
al.’s (1984) ABCS was the first scale developed to assess cognitive distortions relating to 
children and sex. The ABCS has since been applied in many studies on child contact sex 
offenders (e.g., Allan, Grace, Rutherford, & Hudson, 2007; Kolton, Boer, & Boer, 2001; 
Marshall, Hamilton, & Fernandez, 2001; Stermac & Segal, 1989) but, to the knowledge of the 
authors, it has not been applied to CPOs.  
As stated, CPOs might experience distortions of a different quality than CSOs, as 
explored by Howitt and Sheldon (2007) in their C&SA. The current study therefore included 




The data for this project were collected as part of a larger study. For the current study, 
responses from 22 CPOs, 29 CSOs and 17 MOs were available. Offender classification was based on 
self-report information. Individuals were eligible for this study if they had a minimum age of 18 
years, were male and had a sufficient understanding of English reading and writing. It was also 
essential that the individual had no intellectual impairment (that affected his ability to make an 
informed decision about participation or to understand the test material) and a history and/or interest 
in sexual contact with a minor and/or possession, distribution and production of child pornography. 
Participants were recruited from both community sex offender treatment centres and prison settings 
throughout New Zealand. Staff at the treatment centres and the prisons assessed the participants for 
eligibility, thus, no information was available on the representativeness of this sample. There were 
only few significant differences in demographics between the offender groups (see Table 1): Only one 
CPO was in prison at the time of data collection in comparison to 90% of CSOs (n = 26) and nearly 
60% of MOs (n = 10). Overall, the difference in their status (community vs. prison) between CPOs 
and CSOs was found to be highly significant (p < .001, Fisher’s exact test). Hence, the demographic 
differences between CPOs and CPOs may reflect a difference in their prison status. Indeed, 
participants in the community were found to have a higher average education than participants in 
prison (Mdn = 12 vs. Mdn = 8), U = 341.5, z = −2.565, p = .01, r = −.315 and were less likely to 
belong to an ethnic minority (i.e., Maori; p < .05, Fisher’s exact test). Table 1 also provides details of 
the contact sexual crimes committed by CSOs and MOs; no data were available on the timely order of 
crimes committed by MOs. Of the 46 offenders with contact sex offences, 6 self-identified as 
producers of child pornographic material. 
[insert Table 1] 
Instruments and procedure  
Each participant responded to a self-guided survey provided on portable computers, covering 
different assessment areas, such as lifestyle and criminal history. The current study is focused on the 
last subsection of this survey, which consisted of the following questionnaires. The ABCS (Abel et 
al., 1984) contains 29 statements regarding children and sex, such as ‘Most children 13 (or younger) 
would enjoy having sex with an adult, and it wouldn’t harm the child in the future’. In the original 
research, factor analysis revealed six different dimensions underlying the cognitions of these samples, 
which indicates that offenders endorse different types of cognitions. Abel et al. (1989) found that 
CSOs were significantly more deviant than normal controls on all six dimensions of the scale. 
Overall, the scale is commonly used and has high to moderate levels of reliability (internal 
consistency: α = .59−.64 and test–retest reliabilities: r = .64−.76; Tierny & McCabe, 2001). 
In order to add items with potentially higher content-validity for CPOs, two of the 
authors independently chose items from the C&SA that appeared specific to child 
pornography offending. Ten items were agreed upon, namely items 3, 4, 7, 9, 12, 13, 15, 18 
and 19 (Items 30–39 in Table 2). Item 16, ‘Children are more reliable and more trusting than 
adults’, arguably refers to emotional congruence with children; however, the original wording 
appeared too general to differentiate endorsement of distorted thought content. It was thus 
rephrased to ‘I feel more comfortable with children than adults’ to aim for a self-focused 
response on part of the offender. 
Participants were required to rank the items on a 5-point Likert scale from 1 for 
‘strongly agree’ to 5 ‘strongly disagree’, with 3 as the neutral point of neither agreement nor 
disagreement. Thus, lower scores reflect stronger agreement with offence-supportive 
statements, and are thus considered indicative of the presence of cognitive distortions. 
[insert Table 2 about here] 
Analysis 
The methodology employed followed the structure provided by Howitt and Sheldon 
(2007), however, in the current study, item responses were analysed using a principal 
component analysis (PCA) rather than Principal Axis Factor Analysis. While factor analysis 
derives an underlying model as the basis for factor extraction, PCA is a dimension-reduction 
technique used to simplify a variable set to its latent principal components by examining item 
clusters based on their variance–covariance structure (Johnson & Wichern, 2002). As outlined 
by Afifi, Clark, and May (2004), dimension reduction occurs by selecting the variables 
belonging to the principal components that explain the majority of the overall variance rather 
than the shared variance between items. In this way, PCA remains more closely related to the 
original data-set by providing a lower-level representation. In addition, PCA has a strong 
exploratory element given that it results in a reduced number of principal components that 
represent meaningful item ‘clusters’, weighted according to their explanatory power. 
Both factor analysis and PCA provide an interesting methodological choice given the 
very small number of participants available. Similarly, Howitt and Sheldon (2007) 
acknowledged the limited generalisability of their analysis and presented the theoretical value 
of their findings as supportive of their methodology. Although it is conventionally 
recommended to have 10–15 cases per item for a successful factor analysis, there are no 
standard minimum numbers (SAS Library, 1995) and it is generally recommended to have 
more cases than variables. Field (2009) thus proposed using the Kaiser–Meyer– Olkin 
measure of sampling adequacy (KMO) to assess the value of conducting factor analytic 
methods, with higher KMO values suggesting more reliable results. As the current study 
yielded a comparable sample size, it is acknowledged that the reported findings need to be 
considered as exploratory and that validation with a larger sample is desirable. 
Results 
Descriptive analysis of cognitive distortions items 
Overall, there was a potential score range of 39 (strongly agree for all items) to 195 (strongly 
disagree for all items). Participants had a median score of 162, with scores ranging from 85 to 195. 
This reveals a clear tendency towards the higher end of the response scale, conveying that more 
people disagreed with the statements than agreed to them. Scores were found to be normally 
distributed, D(68) = .093, p > .05, K–S test, with no significant outliers in the sum score distribution. 
Item responses were statistically independent from participants’ status (community vs. prison, rpb = 
−.027), their age (rS = .115) and education levels (rS = −.042). Table 2 displays the percentage of 
participants who agreed or strongly agreed with the items. Items receiving comparably high levels of 
support were: ‘An adult can tell if having sex with a young child will emotionally damage the child in 
the future’ (41.18%), ‘For many men, sex offences against children are the result of stress and the 
offence helped to relieve the stress’ (30.88%), ‘My daughter (son) or other young child knows that I 
will still love her (him) even if she (he) refuses to be sexual with me’ (27.94%), and ‘An adult can 
know just how much sex between him (her) and a child will hurt the child later on’ (26.47%). Low 
endorsement was received by items such as: ‘When a young child has sex with an adult, it helps the 
child learn how to relate to adults in the future’ (2.94%), ‘If an adult has sex with a young child it 
prevents the child from having sexual hang-ups in the future’ (2.94%), ‘A man is justified in having 
sex with his children or step-children, if his wife doesn’t like sex’ (1.47%) and ‘It’s better to have sex 
with your child (or someone else’s child) than to have an affair’ (0%).  
All but the three most strongly endorsed items had a median score of 4 (disagree) or 5 
(strongly disagree), with the exception of Item 13 (Mdn = 3.5; ‘An adult can tell if having sex with a 
young child will emotionally damage the child in the future’), Item 19 (Mdn = 3.5; ‘My daughter 
[son] or other young child knows that I will still love her [him] even if she [he] refuses to be sexual 
with me’) and Item 35 (Mdn = 3; ‘For many men, sex offences against children are the result of stress 
and the offence helped to relieve the stress’). In summary, endorsement of the cognitive distortion 
items was low across all offender subgroups. 
Group Comparisons 
Sum scores. CPOs had a median sum score of 170 (range: 95–195), CSOs had a median sum 
score of 159 (range: 101–195), and MOs had a median sum score of 146 (range: 85–195), conveying 
that cognitive distortion items were mostly endorsed by contact offenders (MOs > CSOs). Box plot 
analysis identified one outlier in the group of CPOs, with a sum score of 95. After removal of the 
outlier, the difference in sum scores between offender types just reached significance, H(2) = 5.992, p 
= .05. Post-hoc Mann–Whitney tests between CPOs and CSOs and CSOs and MOs did not reach 
significance; hence, the overall significance finding is based on the difference between CPOs and 
MOs. In summary, MOs were found to be significantly more likely to endorse the cognitive distortion 
items than CPOs. CSOs’ endorsement was not significantly different from either offender subgroup. 
Scale comparisons. Kruskal–Wallis tests were conducted to test for differences 
between the offender groups on the original scales, i.e., the ABCS and the selected items from 
C&SA. There was a significant difference between the offender groups on the ABCS sum 
scores, H(2) = 7.087, p < .05. CPOs had significantly higher sum scores on the ABCS than 
the other two offender groups, U = 206, z = −1.937, p (one-tailed) < .05, r = −.27 (only tested 
with CSOs). There were no significant differences between the offender groups on the C&SA 
items. 
Principal component analysis of cognitive distortions 
PCA is dependent on two main criteria: Intercorrelations between items and adequacy 
of sample size. Analysis of the intercorrelation matrix between all items identified only four 
items with ten or more intercorrelations lower than rS = ∣.3∣. PCA with Varimax rotation was 
conducted, extracting seven independent components, which explained about 75% of the total 
variance and reproduced 80% of the original item correlations with only minor deviations (for 
factor loadings, see Table 2). KMO was .829, which confirmed adequacy of the sample size. 
Analysis of KMO values for individual variables indicated acceptable values across all 
variables. Visual analysis of the scree-plot revealed a second inflexion after four components, 
however, this solution only explained 66% of the overall variance and omitted one item. 
Hence, the seven-component structure was retained (see Table 2). 
Component 1 consisted of 13 items, explaining about one-fifth of the total variance. 
These items shared many of the features in Ward and Keenan’s (1999) description of 
Children as Sexual Objects: perception of children as consensual sex partners, denial of harm, 
sex as expression of love and free choice by all participants. Hence, the title Sexual 
Objectification of Children was chosen. Subscale reliability of Component 1, using 
Cronbach’s alpha, was α = .96 (lowest item-total correlation: r = .662). Component 2 
consisted of five items, explaining about 12% of the total variance. Items here combined 
features from Ward and Keenan’s Entitlement and Children as Sexual Objects and 
communicate a sense of blame attribution. The component was therefore labelled as 
Justification. This subscale had an alpha of α = .885 with the lowest item-total correlation at r 
= .636. Component 3 consisted of five items, explaining 11% of the total variance, relating to 
cognitions describing children as sexually active. This subscale, labelled Children as Sexual 
Agents, had a subscale alpha of α = .894 and the lowest item-total correlation at r = .626.  
The six items of Component 4 combine features from Ward and Keenan’s 
Uncontrollability and Nature of Harm. In these statements, the offender either denies control 
over the situation or believes he can minimise harm to the victims. Therefore, the factor was 
labelled Denial of Sex Offender Status, given that the offender believes that he is different 
from the ‘typical’ sex offender. Subscale alpha was α =.844, with the lowest item-total 
correlation at r = .509. The four items belonging to Component 5 resulted in a scale alpha of α 
= .756 and the lowest item-total correlation was at r = .452. These items described some 
understanding of the negativity of one’s action, and hence were labelled Emphasis on Cognitive 
Cognitive Element. They explain about 10% of the total variance. Component 6 also combined 
features from Ward and Keenan’s Nature of Harm and Uncontrollability but emphasised the dominant 
position of the self, similar to their Entitlement schema. Thus, this component was labelled Power and 
Entitlement. This subscale had an alpha of α = .82, with the lowest item-total correlation of r = .517, 
and explained 7% of the total variance. 
Component 7 only constituted one item, Item 19, ‘My daughter [son] or other young child 
knows that I will still love her [him] even if she [he] refuses to be sexual with me’. The item further 
stood out given that none of the offenders agreed or strongly agreed to this item. This is particularly 
interesting given some of the other components contain items that argue favourably towards potential 
harm minimisation, however, there seems to be a general understanding that incestuous sexual abuse 
does interrupt a healthy child– parent relationship. Given the singular outlier position of this item, it is 
not considered a genuine component. 
In summary, dimension reduction revealed at least six meaningful underlying dimensions to 
these cognitions items. The subscale alphas were very high, resulting from the high number of 
participants disagreeing with these statements. As assumptions for ANOVA were not fulfilled, group 
differences on the cognitive distortion sum scores were tested using Kruskal–Wallis tests. The 
offender types significantly differed in their scores on three components, Justification, H(2) = 14.344, 
p < .01, Children as Sexual Agents, H(2) = 7.756, p < .05 and Power and Entitlement, H(2) = 10.266, 
p < .01. Selected Mann–Whitney tests were conducted to follow up these findings, with a Bonferroni-
corrected alpha at .025. It appeared that CPOs were significantly more likely to disagree with these 
cognitive distortion statements than the other two offender types, with no significant difference 
between CSOs and MOs [only tested on CSOs, Justification: U = 159, z = −2.801, p (one-tailed) < 
.01, r = −.39; Children as Sexual Agents: U = 199, z = −2.338, p (one-tailed) < .01, r = −.33; Power 
and Entitlement: U = 154, z = −2.787, p (one-tailed) < .01, r = −.4]. 
Result summary 
Overall, endorsement of the cognitive distortion items was generally low. MOs showed the 
highest affirmation across all offender subtypes, followed by CSOs; scale comparisons revealed that 
the identified difference was based solely on the participants’ performance on the ABCS items. 
Follow-up item analysis using PCA showed that the differences amongst offender subgroups were 
based on three item components: Justification, Children as Sexual Agents and Power and Entitlement, 
with CPOs being significantly less likely to endorse these themes than contact sex offenders. There 
was no significant difference between CSOs and MOs in their agreement on cognitive distortion 
items. 
Discussion 
The current study explored the endorsement of cognitive distortions of CPOs in 
comparison to offenders with contact child victims. An established measure, the ABCS, was 
amended with 10 items retrieved from the Children and Sexual Activities Scale, in order to 
test for cognitive distortions with higher content validity for CPOs. The study sample 
included 22 CPOs, 29 CSOs and 17 offenders with both offence types. Overall, these MOs 
showed the highest endorsement of cognitive distortions, followed by CSOs. There were 
significant differences between CPOs and contact offenders (both CSOs and MOs) on the 
scale components Justification, Children as Sexual Agents and Power and Entitlement.  
The current findings raised some critical points, regarding the role of cognitive 
distortions as potential facilitators of contact sex offending, the need for a specialist 
assessment tool for CPOs, as well as the challenges surrounding the assessment of cognitive 
distortions. 
Cognitive distortions as potential facilitators of contact sex offending 
The most recent meta-analysis on CPOs (Babchishin, Hanson, & VanZuylen, 2014) 
has just been released, comprising 30 offender samples (with ns ranging from 98 to 2,702). In 
comparing CPOs with and without contact sex offences, Babchishin et al. identified the main 
predictors of cross-over from child pornography to contact sex offending, namely, a sexual 
interest in children, access to children, high levels of antisociality and few psychological 
barriers to acting on one’s sexually deviant interests. In the current study, CPOs were found to 
have the highest level of disagreement with the cognitive distortion items in general. In 
particular, CPOs were found to be less likely to agree to statements blaming other people 
(including their victims) for their sexual actions, to consider children as sexually willing and 
active, and to feel entitled to their sexual behaviour, thus portraying themselves as more 
aware of consent issues regarding child–adult sexual activities and as more conscious of their 
position of power over the victim than offenders with a contact victim. These findings are in 
line with Babchishin et al.’s research, exposing little evidence of antisociality and high 
psychological barriers amongst this noncontact offender group.  
Across all three offender subgroups, MOs expressed the strongest endorsement of 
cognitive distortions, most significantly on the components of Children as Sexual Agents, 
Entitlement and Justification. Again, the current study confirms Babchishin et al.’s 
hypotheses, with MOs clearly expressing a sexual interest in children (Children as Sexual 
Agents), high levels of antisociality (Entitlement) and few psychological barriers in acting on 
their impulses (Justification). However, these findings stand in contrast to Elliott et al.’s 
(2012) large-scale comparison study where MOs were found to express the least endorsement 
of cognitive distortions in comparison to CSOs and CPOs, using the Victim Empathy 
Distortion Scale (Beckett & Fisher, 1994) and the Children and Sex Cognitions Questionnaire 
(Beckett, 1987). However, Elliott et al. described these results as ‘contradictory’ (p. 11) given 
that MOs exposed themselves not only to sexual abuse imagery but also to the ‘harmful realities of the 
sexual offense process’ (p. 11). Indeed, in a recent study on offence motivations (Merdian, Boer, 
Thakker, Wilson, & Curtis, 2013), MOs were found to be more likely than CPOs to self-identify a 
sexual interest in minors as their main motivation to view child pornography, pointing towards higher 
endorsement of cognitive distortions relating to children and sex. An alternative explanation can be 
seen in the hypothesis that distorted cognitions are subject to change as the offender progresses in his 
offending behaviour (Carr, 2006; O’Brien & Webster, 2007; Quayle & Taylor, 2003), with CPOs and 
MOs arguably being placed at different stages on the fantasy versus contact-driven offending 
continuum. For example, Quayle and Taylor (2001) reported the case of a 33-year-old online sex 
offender, who, while progressing in his behaviour from child pornography consumption to engaging 
with victims online, also changed his language and self-portrayal from initially presenting himself as a 
child to that of a sexually aggressive adult, potentially indicating a shift in his cognitive processes. 
Thus, it is expected that contact and noncontact offenders endorse different types of cognitive 
distortions, and that these adapt following reinforcement from behavioural changes. 
Need for a specialised assessment tool for CPOs 
The low endorsement of cognitive distortions on part of CPOs may confirm the assumption 
that CPOs’ cognitions are offence-specific and thus not picked up with existing scales. Indeed, CPOs’ 
agreement was higher for items that were targeted towards their unique criminal situation, for 
example, Item 32 (‘Sexual thoughts about a child are not that bad because it does not really hurt the 
child’) and Item 33 (‘Just looking at a naked child is not as bad as touching and will probably not 
affect the child as much’). As expected, agreement to these items was reduced for CSOs (Item 32 
agreed by 29% MOs, 23% CPOs, 10% CSOs; Item 33 agreed by 36% CPOs, 29% MOs, 10% CSOs). 
CPOs have previously been found to endorse distortion items portraying children as sexual objects 
and to be less likely to endorse justification statements (Howitt & Sheldon, 2007). In the current 
study, offenders did not differ on items portraying children as sexual objects but CPOs displayed the 
lowest agreement with regards to justification items. The literature further suggested that CPOs are 
less inclined to identify emotionally with children (e.g., Babchishin et al., 2010; Elliott et al., 2012). 
None of the extracted components in this study explicitly referred to emotional identification with 
children, however, content analysis suggested the following items as measures of emotional 
identification; Item 15 (‘I show my love and affection to a child by having sex with her (him)’; agreed 
by 23% MOs, 10% CSOs, 5% CPOs), Item 23 (‘My relationship with my daughter (son) or other 
child is strengthened by the fact that we have sex together’; agreed by 18% MOs, 5% CPOs, 0% 
CSOs), and Item 37 (‘I feel more comfortable with children than adults’; agreed by 29% MOs, 23% 
CPOs, 21% CSOs). While MOs showed the strongest support for these items, CPOs endorsement was 
higher than CSOs’ on all but the first, contact-related item. Lastly, it has also been suggested that 
CPOs may support cognitions questioning societal morals (Sheldon & Howitt, 2007), as expressed in 
Item 12 (‘Sometimes in the future, our society will realise that sex between a child and an adult is all 
right’). Again, MOs showed the highest agreement (29%) with none of the other offender types 
supporting this statement. 
In summary, these findings confirm that the CPOs in this sample had low 
endorsement of cognitive distortions in general but that there is some value in exploring 
offence-specific cognitions with this offender subgroup. There was no significant difference 
between the offender subgroups’ agreement to cognitive distortions when only the items from 
the C&SA were examined. At the start of the paper, two explanations were proposed for the 
identified difference between CPOs and contact CSOs in their endorsement of cognitive 
distortions, namely, that CPOs endorse fewer cognitive distortions than contact offenders, or 
that they endorse cognitive distortions of a different quality. With the current findings in 
mind, the following interim clarifications can be added: (1) CPOs endorse fewer cognitive 
distortions than contact CSOs on conventional measures of attitudes towards children and sex 
and (2) CPOs endorse cognitive distortions of particular relevance to their offending, which 
are currently not included in standardised measures. This underlines the need for a more 
specialised assessment tool for non-contact offenders. 
Challenges surrounding the assessment of cognitive distortions 
The total scale and all subscales (with the exception of Item 19) resulted in very high 
scale reliability (α ranging from .756 to .968). This finding, even though desired, is most 
likely the result of a lack of variance in the participants’ response patterns. Indeed, the 
participants showed a clear tendency towards the higher end of the Likert scale (rejection of 
items). The high disagreement with the items is statistically concerning as it is questionable if 
a ceiling effect can be meaningfully interpreted. 
In addition, the content validity of the current scale, and arguably other scales 
purporting to measure cognitive distortion, is to be challenged. As indicated in the 
introduction of this paper, there is a professional debate surrounding the construct cognitive 
distortions in terms of its definition and appropriate measurement. When applying Beck’s 
(1963) comparably broad definition of cognitive distortions as unfounded or dysfunctional 
thought content, cognitive distortions should refer to thoughts that a ‘reasonable person’ 
would not endorse. However, some of the items in the current scale, for example, Item 32 
(‘Sexual thoughts about a child are not that bad because it does not really hurt the child’) or 
Item 37 (‘I feel more comfortable with children than adults’) may not to fit this definition. 
This observation is further confirmed when reviewing the items with high endorsement in 
Howitt and Sheldon’s (2007) original study on the C&SA, such as ‘A lot of the time men do 
not plan their sex offences involving children – they just happen’ (41.2% agreement), 
‘Children are innocent and want to please adults’ (66.6% agreement), ‘For many men, their 
sex offences involving children were the result of stress and the offending behaviour helped 
to relieve the stress’ (43.1% agreement) and ‘Children are more reliable and more trusting than adults’ 
(92.2% agreement). As in the current study, items with a positive framing of sexual activities between 
children and adults were endorsed with a much lower frequency, for example, ‘Sexual activities with 
children can make a child feel closer to adults’ (19.6% agreement) and ‘Sometime in the future our 
society will realise that sex between a child and adult is alright’ (5.9% agreement). Thus, the extent of 
distorted thought content within so-called cognitive distortion scales cannot be stated without a 
validation based on normative data from a non-offending control population.  
These concerns surrounding the content validity of the existing scales are closely related to, or 
a consequence of, the lack of construct validity. There is a body of research challenging what exactly 
assessments of cognitive distortions claim to measure. Ó Ciardha and Gannon (2011) and Maruna and 
Mann (2006) pointed to the wide range of meanings associated with the term cognitive distortions, 
ranging from higher order belief systems to post-offence rationalisations and excuses. Maruna and 
Mann stated that Abel et al. (1989) extended Beck’s (1963) original definition of cognitive distortions 
to include a self-serving bias on part of the offenders, thus potentially representing them as post-hoc 
justifications rather than genuine attitude differences regarding children and sex. Maruna and Mann 
(2006) challenged the negative evaluation of such ‘excuse-making’, suggesting that the attribution of 
shameful or otherwise negative events to external and unstable causes represents a normal coping 
mechanism with no empirical relationship to risk. In addition, due to their nature, post-hoc 
rationalisations cannot be regarded as causal to offending and should be considered separate from 
underlying offence-supportive beliefs that may genuinely contribute to the offending behaviour.  
These considerations allow two main conclusions. First, the current component structure is 
reflective of the nature of the original items that had been included in the analysis, and is thus biased 
towards Abel et al.’s (1984) and Howitt and Sheldon’s (2007) conceptualisation of cognitive 
distortions. Thus, an exploration of cognitive distortions of CPOs may benefit from an additional 
theoretical approach. Secondly, the discussion about the lack of content and construct validity of 
cognitive distortion scales relates back to the issue concerning their appropriate measurement and the 
high transparency of these scales. As discussed, the research focus has in recent years expanded to 
include indirect measures of cognitions, such as the Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure 
(Barnes-Holmes et al., 2006) or the Implicit Association Test (Gray et al., 2005), which may be 
considered more apt at ‘breaking through’ the outer layer of excuse-making. Keown, Gannon, and 
Ward (2010) examined the cognitive distortions of CSOs by using three differing assessment 
methods: an interview (explicit assessment with direct researcher input), a questionnaire (explicit 
assessment without direct researcher input) and an experimental task (Rapid Serial Visual 
Presentation-Modified; implicit assessment). Between these assessment methods, there was no 
agreement regarding the cognitive distortions identified for each individual, confirming that the 
current understanding of cognitive distortions does not define a theoretical construct but rests on its 
operational definition based on the choice of measurement. 
Limitations of the current study 
There are two main concerns with this study. The study included a small sample 
which significantly reduces the generalisability of the findings. In addition, study 
participation was voluntary and based on self-report data. A potential methodological 
limitation is that most offenders belonging to the group of CSOs and MOs were located in 
prison at the time of data collection while nearly all CPOs resided in the community, which 
could have affected their responses to the survey questions. In addition, the location of an 
offender determined the procedures of data collection; thus, presence of the main researcher 
and other participants could have influenced the responses. The scale has a number of 
limitations, particularly its transparent nature. This is especially concerning given that CSOs 
might often be tested in a setting where participants are prone to misrepresentation 
(Blumenthal, Gudjonsson, & Burns, 1999; Gannon, Keown, & Polaschek, 2007). Finally, the 
sample used to assess the psychometric properties of the scale was also used as a study 
sample to explore differences between CPOs and CSOs. Even though this is common in 
studies regarding scale development (e.g., Howitt & Sheldon, 2007), it is only acceptable as a 
form of exploratory investigation and needs to be followed up with more rigorous research. 
Conclusion 
While the validity of this research is limited by its small sample size, it provides some 
preliminary findings of interest. The most significant finding of this study is that CPOs were 
less inclined to endorse cognitive distortions relating to children and sex than contact sex 
offenders. It was expected that an understanding of the cognitive processes of CPOs will 
provide further insight into the role of cognitive distortions in the contact offence process. 
The strong endorsement of cognitive distortions by MOs provides some support for the 
relationship between maladaptive schemata and contact sex offending, however, a 
developmental cause needs to be clarified. Overall, the profile of MOs raises concerns; based 
on their strong pedophilic preferences and resilient endorsement of cognitive distortions, MOs 
are potentially placed at a high risk of reoffending, for both child pornography and contact 
sex offending (see Babchishin et al., 2014). However, these findings may also imply that such 
cognitive distortions are causally linked to contact sex offending. For example, CPOs may not 
perceive their offending as severe enough to develop the same level of justifications as do 
contact sex offenders. 
In practical terms, these preliminary results show that the ABCS scale can be 
meaningfully extended using items from the C&SA, and that it has very good psychometric 
properties for its application on CPOs, for example, as a pre-treatment assessment tool. 
Furthermore, the findings have relevance for the treatment of CPOs as the offenders’ 
motivation to commit a sexual crime might consequently be different from contact sex 
offenders, specifically with regards to power and consensus issues. For example, CPOs 
appear to be less inclined to blame the victim. Reversely, an offender who has a higher agreement 
with the items on Power and Entitlement or Children as Sexual Agents may thus be at a higher risk to 
conduct a contact sex offence. However, the concerns raised regarding the conceptualisation and 
terminological specificity of cognitive distortions call for further research, employing various means 
of their measurement, before these findings can be meaningfully implemented in the existing offender 
management.  
The paper raised some noteworthy questions about the definition of cognitive distortions and 
their appropriate measurement, which limit the validity of existing assessment tools. In the current 
study, most participants rejected the endorsement of cognitive distortions, indicating that most CSOs 
do not hold such distortions. Alternatively, some offenders may superficially endorse some cognitive 
distortions as a way of feeling more comfortable with this behaviour, while still maintaining an 
awareness of the inappropriateness of his actions. Furthermore, the presence or absence of a distortion 
and the degree to which it is endorsed may fluctuate over time. These possibilities highlight the 
complexity of the topic and therefore the challenges for researchers in this area. 
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Table 1: Characteristics of the Offender Samples 
 Total CSEMOs CSOs MOs sign. Differences 
Demographics                       n = 68 n = 22 n = 29 n = 17 
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Unemployed 16.18 9.09 24.14 11.76  
Own business 23.53 27.27 20.69 23.53  
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Table 2: Percentage agreeing/strongly agreeing with cognitive distortions and factor loadings on the extracted components 





1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10 Most children 13 (or younger) would enjoy having sex with an adult, and it wouldn't harm the child in the future. 8.82 .760       
17 An adult fondling a young child or having the child fondle the adult will not cause the child any harm. 5.88 .745       
24 If a child has sex with an adult, the child will look back at the experience as an adult and see it as a positive experience. 5.88 .733  .421     
3 A child 13 or younger can make her (his) own decision as to whether she (he) wants to have sex with an adult or not. 14.71 .710       
15 I show my love and affection to a child by having sex with her (him). 11.76 .707 .403      
1 If a young child stares at my genitals it means the child likes what she (he) sees and is enjoying watching my genitals. 13.24 .637       
12 Sometimes in the future, our society will realize that sex between a child and an adult is all right. 7.35 .635       
11 Children don't tell others about having sex with a parent (or other adult) because they really like it and want it to continue. 8.82 .629  .392     
23 My relationship with daughter (son) or other child is strengthened by the fact that we have sex together. 5.88 .609 .425      
7 Having sex with a child is a good way for an adult to teach the child about sex. 5.88 .602 .460 .425     
14 An adult just feeling a child's body all over without touching her (his) genitals is not really being sexual with the child. 11.76 .591     .403  
Commented [hlm1]:  
Reviewer 1: Change sorting according to component 
loadings rather than agreement 
Response: see changes 
21 If an adult has sex with a young child it prevents the child from having sexual hang-ups in the future. 2.94 .569 .414 .489     
32 Sexual thoughts about a child are not that bad because it does not really hurt the child. 19.12 .544    .493   
2 A man is justified in having sex with his children or step-children, if his wife doesn't like sex. 1.47  .819      
4 A child who doesn't physically resist an adult's sexual advances, really wants to have sex with the adult. 11.76  .597   .436   
9 When a young child has sex with an adult, it helps the child learn how to relate to adults in the future. 2.94 .518 .564      
5 If a 13 year old (or younger) child flirts with an adult, it means he (she) wants to have sex with the adult. 13.24 .430 .535 .406  .399   
16 It's better to have sex with your child (or someone else's child) than to have an affair. 0.00  .766      
20 When a young child asks an adult about sex, it means she (he) wants to see the adult's sex organs or have sex with the adult. 4.41   .676     
18 A child will never have sex with an adult unless the child really wants to. 11.76 .478  .669     
8 
If I tell my young child (step-child or close relative) what to do 
sexually and they do it, that means they will always do it because 
they really want to. 
13.24  .490 .610     
26 When children watch an adult masturbate, it helps the child learn about sex. 11.76 .546  .605     
34 Children who are molested by more than one adult probably are doing something to attract adults to them. 13.24   .406     
13 An adult can tell if having sex with a young child will emotionally damage the child in the future. 41.18    .782    
27 An adult can know just how much sex between him (her) and a child will hurt the child later on. 26.47    .773    
36 Sometimes the offender suffers, loses or is hurt the most. 22.06    .736    
31 Some people who have sex with children are not true “sex offenders” – they are out of control and make a mistake. 22.06    .728    
35 For many men, sex offences against children are the result of stress and the offence helped to relieve the stress. 30.88    .450    
30 Because men have higher sexual needs, it is not always possible to control sexual urges. 19.12    .448 .422   
28 If a person is attracted to sex with children, he (she) should solve that problem themselves and not talk to professionals. 5.88     .821   
29 There is no effective treatment for child molestation. 10.29     .702   
22 When a young child walks in front of me with no or only a few clothes on, she (he) is trying to arouse me. 4.41   .426  .574   
33 Just looking at a naked child is not as bad as touching and will probably not affect the child as much. 23.53 .515    .521   
39 A person should have sex whenever it is needed. 16.18      .631  
25 
The only way I could do harm to a child when having sex with her 
(him) would be to use physical force to get her (him) to have sex 
with me. 
17.65      .584  
38 Children are supposed to do what adults want and this might include serving their sexual needs. 4.41      .523  
37 I feel more comfortable with children than adults. 23.53 .470     .494  
6 Sex between a 13 year old (or younger child) and an adult causes the child no emotional problems. 5.88   .402   .468  
19 My daughter (son) or other young child knows that I will still love her (him) even if she (he) refuses to be sexual with me. 27.94       .810 
          
Table 3: Seven-Component Structure Resulting from Principal Component Analysis on 




































































% Explained variance: 
21.46 11.51 10.92 9.88 9.25 7.13 4.98 
Cronbach’s alpha: 
.960 .885 .894 .844 .756 .820  
Note. Component labels are the result of a discussion between the researcher and three independent 
sources, that is, a layperson and two researchers experienced in the area of sexual crimes. 
 
 
 
 
 
